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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANCES O'HAIR, 
Plamtiff-A ppelloot, 
vs. 
JOHN S. KOUNALIS and 
GEORGE KOUNALIS, 
Def enda;nts-Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
11445 
Th:iis is an action brought by the plaintiff to recover 
money allegedly loaned to both defendants more than five 
and one-half years ( 5%) before the action was com-
menced. [R. 1] 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial judge granted the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment based uipon the deposition of the 
parties [R. 7] ; and also entered an order denying plain-
tiff's motion to set aside the said judgment [R. 10] 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendants ask that the judgment of the trial 
judge be affirmed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff '·s parents died when she was fourteen 
(14) yeans of age and her aunt was appointed her legal 
guardian. The aunt hired Mrs. Leone Small, who was the 
defendant John S. Kounalis' mother-in-law to stay with 
her. The aunt moved out, but Mr·s. Small -stayed on with 
the plaintiff and her sister for about four ( 4) years and 
until they graduated from high school in 1962. [Dep. Pl. 
pp. 4-5] During this time, Mrs. Small and John Kounalis' 
family were the closest thing to a real family the plaintiff 
had. [Dep. JK p. 4] 
The plaintiff and her sister each shared equally in 
the family esta'te consisting of some cash as•sets ; a home 
which sold for $21,000.00 and some inheritance from their 
grandfather's estate. [Dep. Pl. p. 7, 38] The plaintiff's 
share amounted to over $11,000.00 which she received 
jUJst after she turned eighteen (18) in January, 1962. 
[Dep. Pl. p. 8] By Aug11st of 1963, she had spent the 
entire inheritance. [Dep. Pl. p. 35-36] During this 
time, the defendant, John Kounalis, advised her not t-0 
spend the money but rather to invest it. John stated she 
seemed ito have an ohsession to get rid of her money and 
refused to consider investments. [Dep. JK p. 16] 
Af.ter the plaintiff turned eighteen (18), she began 
to date George Kounalis who at that time was unmarried. 
[Dep. GK p. 15 L. 25; p. 16 L. 1] George testified that 
these dates averaged about once a week over ten months 
from Oct. 1962 through July 1963. He stated the plain-
tiff would call him seeking out the date. [Dep. GK pp. 
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10-11] John Kounalis stated the plaintiff was very much 
m love with Georrge. [Dep. JK p. 22] ; and the plaintiff 
herself admitted she liked George and wanted to help him 
out any way she could. [Dep. Pl. pp. 13-14] 
Sometime in 1962, George Kounalis became involved 
in criminal li1tigat,ion in California. The attorney's fees 
and other cosfa of def ending this action became impor-
tant. George K<ounalis sold some of his stock to rai,se 
about $2,500.00 to pay said ex'Penses [Dep. GK pp. 8-9] 
At the time he was employed for Univac at Sperry Rand 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. [Dep. GK p. 6] John testified 
that George's nine (9) brothers and sisters could have 
raised the remaining money to def end this action had it 
been necessary to do so. [Dep. JK pp. 9-10] 
However at about this same time, the plaintiff be-
came aware of the circumstances and went directly to 
John Kounalis offering to give him money to help 
George. She conditioned the payment on the promise that 
.John would not teU George where the money was coming 
from. [Dep. JK p. 17 L. 6-10; p. 5 L. 18-23] John stated 
the money was given as a gift because the plaintiff 
thought quite a bi,t of George. [Dep. JK p. 12 L. 15-21] 
At least two (2) clhecks were then written out to John 
and deposited by John in his private bank account. John 
would then write checks of a similar amount made out 
to George. [Dep. JK pp. 6-7] John stated that he never 
discussed with George anything about the plaintiff being 
the one who made the advances; and he did not know how 
George found out about it. [Dep. JK pp. 22-23] 
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George testified that it was not until about March 
of 1963 that he first learned that the plaintiff had ad~ 
vanced the money. [Dep. GK p. 10] This was after the 
money had been given to John and also after John had 
given the money to George. George further testified that 
when he talked to the plaintiff about this matter she said 
it was a gift and she didn't want to be repaid. [Dep. GK 
p. 16] Ge,orge did remember receiving a check from John 
in November, 1962 for about $500.00 and one in January, 
1963 for about $1,500.00. [Dep. GK p. 7] He sold some 
of the stocks after the first loan was received in N ovem-
ber, 1962; and of the $2,500.00 received from the sale, he 
sent $1,000.00 to his attorney as a retainer and paid John 
back $920.00. [Dep. GK p. 9] 
The plaintiff's testimony agrees with these state-
ments made by both John and George. She testified that 
all monies were given to John and sib.e never had any 
contact with Georg1e. [Dep. PL pp. 12, 20-21] She 
stated she could have given the money to George but he 
never asked for it. [Dep. Pl. P. 13] She further stated 
that 1she had no personal knowledge that George ever 
received the money she gave to John; nor did she have 
any personal knowledge that George knew she was the 
ione advancing the money. [Dep. PL pp. 21, 24] She 
stated unequivocably that George Kounalis neve·r did tell 
her the money would be repaid. [Dep. PL p. 29] The 
p1aintiff admits that there were no written agreements 
pertaining to these transactions but rather all of the 
understandings were verbal. [Dep. PL p. 17] 
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Insofar as her dealings with John Kounalis were 
eoncerned, the plaintiff stated she made advances to John 
in October, 1962, and January, 1963. [Dep. PL pp. 9-10] 
She states in one part of her deposition that John Koun-
alis said the money would be repaid in five or six (5 or 
6) years. [Dep. PL p. 11] However, when asked later in 
the deposition to state again what she remembered about 
this initial conve,rsa,tion, she changed her testimony and 
remarked that John said it might be two, three or four 
(2, 3 or 4) years. [Dep. Pl. p. 18] 
The plaintiff stated that by the summer of 1963, she 
had gone through her entire inheritance and was in need 
of help. [Dep. Pl. pp. 34-36] She went to John Kounalis 
who owned a small neighborhood grocery store called the 
Liberty Park Market and asked for some food. [Dep. 
Pl. p. 34] John told her she could have anything she 
wanted. [Dep. JK p. 18] This was a common practice 
with the defendant, John Kounali.s, insofar as other 
members of his family were c.oncerned; and many of 
them had received help in the past. The plaintiff contin-
ued to receive assistance until about January, 1964, when 
she moved from the neighborhood. [Dep. Pl. pp. 36, 40] 
From January, 1964, until the complaint was filed in 
August, 1968, the plaintiff never contacted the defendant 
John Kounalis in any way either concerning the loan or 
otherwise. [Dep. Bl. p. 36-37; Dep. JK p. 15 L. 1-3] The 
plaintiff stated that she considered the receipt of gro-
ceries to be partial payment on the monies advanced to 
John Kounalis ; however John denies that there was any 
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conversation to this effect. [Dep. JK p. 18] 
The plaintiff further testified that George Kounalis 
gave her $100.00 about this same period of time she was 
receiving groceries from John. On page 9 of her brief, 
the plaintiff states the time of year in 1964 when this 
$100.00 was paid is not clear. However in her deposition 
the plaintiff said it was while she wa'S still living in the 
apartment on 5th East Street in Salt Lake City, Utah 
[Dep. PL p. 41] ; and she stated to her own counsel that 
she left this apartment sometime in either January or 
February, 1964. [Dep. PL p. 40] Consequently the $100.00 
payment was received prior to or during January or 
February of 1964 and not after that period of time. 
Based upon the foregoing statement of facts and the 
other information gained from reading the depositions 
of rbhe parties, the trial judge, Stewar,t M. Hanson, grant-
ed the defendants' motion for summary judgment. This 
motion \Vas based upon the def ens es raised in the answer 
of the defendants-spedfically the statute of limitations 
as found in §78-12-25 UCA-1953 and the statute of frauds 
found in §25-5-4 UCA-1953. [R. 2] 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT, GEORGE KOUNALIS, CAN-
NOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE DEBT OF JOHN 
KOUNALLS BECAUSE THERE WAS NO WRITTEN 
AGREEMENT TO BECOME LIABLE AS REQUIRED 
BY §25-5-4 (2) UCA-1953. 
Secfion 25-5-4 (2) UCA-1953 states as follows: 
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"25-5-4. Certain Agreements Void Unless Written 
and Subscribed. - In the following cases every 
agreement shall be void unless such agreement, or 
some note o.r memorandum thereof, i1s in writing 
subscribed by the party to be charged therewith: 
... (2) Every promise to answer for the debt, de-
f a ult, or miscarriage of another . . . '' 
The plaintiff stated that all transactions with the 
defendants were verbal. [Dep. PL p. 17] She further 
stated that George Kounalis had never told her the money 
she gave to John would be repaid. [Dep. PL p. 29] All of 
her dealings were with John Kounalis; and nowhere did 
she ever state that John had told her he had been asked 
by George to get the money friom the plaintiff. [Dep. Pl. 
pp. 12, 13, 20, 21] Under these circumstances it is clear 
that the only person who would be liable-if indeed any-
one is liable-would be the defendant, John Kounalis. 
For 1these reasons the court was correct in dismissing 
George Kounalis from the lawsuit. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT, JOHN KOUNALIS, HAD 
NO LEGAL LIABILITY TO REPAY THE PLAIN-
TIFF FOR MONIES ADVANCED BECAUSE ANY 
CLAIM WHICH THE PLAINTIFF MIGHT HA VE 
HAD WAS BARRED BY §78-12-25 UCA-1953. 
Section 78-12-1 UCA-1953 provides that civil actions 
oan be commenced only within the periods prescribed in 
Chapter 12 and after the cause of act:iion .shall have ac-
crued. The pertinent ·section of Chapter 12 which applies 
to the instant ca·se is §78-12-25 which reads as follows: 
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"78-12-25. Within Four (4) Years. (1) An action 
upon a contract, obligation or liability not found-
ed upon an instrument in writing; ... provided 
that action in all of the foregoing cases may be 
oommenced at any time within four (4) years 
after the last charge is made or the last payment 
is received.'' 
The plaintiff testified that the loans were made to 
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John Kounalis in October of 1962 and January of 1963. 
[Dep. Pl. pp. 9-10] The instant action was commenced 
in August of 1968 or more than five and one-half (5112) 
years after the last amount was given to John Kounalis. 
It follows the complaint should be dismissed pursuant 
to §78-12-25 unless the plaintiff can come within the pro-
visions of §78-12-44 UCA-1953. 
This latter section extends the time to bring suit to 
four (4) years after: (1) any part of the principal or in-
terest shall have been paid, or (2) an acknowledgment of 
an existing liability shall have been made, or (3) a prom-
ise fo pay the existing liability shall have been made. 
Subsections (2) and (3) require a writing signed by the 
party to be charged thereby; and consequently these two 
(2) subsections would not apply to the instant case where 
all transactions were verbal. [Dep. PL p. 17] 
w.hether suhseotion (1) of 78-12-44 applies depends 
on the time and nature of the transactions. Plaintiff al-
leges the defendant, John Kounalis, made a payment on 
account by letting the plaintiff charge groceries at his 
store; and also because the defendant, George Kounalis, 
paid $100.00 and $50.00 to the plaintiff. Since the gro-
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ceries were taken during 1963 and January and Febru-
ary, 1964, and f'-i.nce the $100.00 was paid during this 
same period of time [Dep. PL pp. 40-41] ; it is obvious 
each transaction was more than four ( 4) year·s prio·r to 
the date the instant action was filed; and therefore would 
I11ot be of any help to the plaintiff in extending the statute. 
And both the plaintiff and John stated affirmatively that 
they had absolutely no conta0t with each other since Feb-
ruary, 1964. [Dep. PL p. 37 L. 8-10; Dep. JK p. 15 L. 
1-3] 
Nor can the $50.00 payment by George Kounalis in 
1967 be construed as a part payment under §78-12-44. 
Since George had no legal liability to repay the plaintiff 
as shown under POINT I, supra, it follows any payments 
he made were merely gratuitous and would be made as a 
stranger to the contract between the plaintiff and John 
Kounalis and therefore could not affect the statute of 
limitations defense raised by John Kounalis. 
The plaintiff does not contend that George acted as 
the agent of John in paying the $50.00. Rather the plain-
tiff seekJs to hold George Kounalis liable personally in 
this lawsuit because he received the benefit of some of the 
money and she attempts to construe the $50.00 payment to 
extend the statute of limitations as to George. This point 
might have s•ome merit if George were liable in some 
way; but it is obvious in the instant case he is not liable 
except perhaps morally if he feels so inclined. His defense 
under the statute of frauds [§25-5-4 (2) UCA-1953] ne-
gates his legal liabi'1ity and there is no way it can be 
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created by payment of $50.00 some five (5) years after 
the monies were given to his brother without his knowl-
edge. Furtherm<>re, it is clear that all the plaintiff's deal-
ings were with John and she had no meeting of the mind 
wiith George. Nowhere in the depo·sition of the parties is 
there any suggestion that John and George were ever in 
a joint venture and that John had acted as George's 
agent in getting the money from the plaintiff. In fact, 
the plaintiff herself admitted that she had no personal 
knowledge that George even knew that John had gone 
to the plaintiff for the money. [Dep. PL pp. 21, 24] ; and 
George claims that the first he learned of the plaintiff's 
participation was in March, 1963, after the loans had 
already been made. [Dep. GK p. 10] 
The final attempt which the plaintiff makes to over-
come the statute of limitations defense is by saying that 
the debt was not to be repaid for several years and there-
fore the "cause of action" contemplated by §78-12-1 did 
not exist for several years. From this, she reasons that 
the statute of limitations did not begin to run for several 
years. The problem with this position is that the plaintiff 
changed her story so many time-s the trial judge did not 
have any credible, convincing, evidence to determine when 
the repayment was to be made if at all, and the plaintiff 
hel'lself admits as muc.h in her brief. When the plaintiff 
fir.st ,stated her recollection of the initial conversation with 
John Kounalis, she stated affirmatively that John had 
said the money would be repaid in five or six years. 
[Dep. PL p. 11] However, when she was asked later in 
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the deposition to state again what she remembered about 
this initial convel'sation, she changed her testimony and 
remarked that John said it might be two, three or four 
years. [Dep. Pl. p. 18] Under these circumstances, the 
trial judge was certainly entitled to find that there was 
no agreement as to time of repayment. In such a situation 
the law holds that the loan was due when made and plain-
tiff could have made a demand for repayment at that 
time. [Lindsey v. Hamlet, 235 Ala. 335, 170 So 234 (1938)] 
Since the plaintiff could demand payment at any time 
after the loans were made, the statute oflimitations would 
begin to run from the same time according to plaintiff's 
own authorities. and since the complaint was not filed until 
more than five and one-half (5%) year's later, it is clear 
the trial judge acted properly in dismissing the action. 
It would not work any real hardship on the defend-
ants to apply the above stated rule of law and find that 
the loans were due when made ; or upon the demand of the 
plaintiff. The trial judge had before him the depositions 
of the parties which showed that George Kiounalis owned 
stock which could have been sold to pay this indebtednes,s 
and that he in fact did sell S'Ome of the stock and repaid 
J,ohn approximately $1,000.00 in November of 1962. [Dep. 
GK p. 9] The trial judge could also have found that the 
defendant, John Kounalis, operated a grocery store and 
had the ability to Tepay the money. He also had the state-
ment of the defendants to the effect that the o,ther broth-
ers and siBters in the family could have raised the money 
tio pay George's court cosits had it not been for the in-
11 
tervention of the plaintiff. [Dep. JK pp. 9-10] Under 
these circumstances, it is clear there would be no gen-
uine is,sue of fact to be tried and the summary judgment 
was properly granted. 
SUMMARY 
For the reasons set forth hereinabove, the def end-
ants submit that there i1s no genuine issue of fact to be 
tried and that the ruling of the tr~al judge should be 
affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
JAMES A. McINTOSH 
Attorney for Responden.ts 
15 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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